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Chapter 19
In the Shadow of the Washington Consensus: 
Cuba’s Rapprochement with Latin America in 
a World Going Unipolar, 1985-1996
the late 1980s and the early 1990s are often described as a period of 
great loneliness for cuba. the retrenchment, and then the fall, of the soviet 
union deprived the island of its main ally. the us government’s hostility 
towards the Revolución remained unwavering. economically, the decline 
and collapse of the eastern Bloc forced the cuban economy into a period 
of adjustment that ended in the dramatic período especial. despite the seem-
ingly unstoppable advance of capitalism that marked those years, howev-
er, cuba did not follow in the footsteps of the former soviet union and the 
other members of the eastern Bloc. the cuban government, led since 1959 
by Fidel castro, confirmed instead its commitment to socialism1.
the cuban anomaly seemed particularly striking in the context of the pro-
cesses that had been taking place in the Western Hemisphere from the early 
1980s on. Faced with deep financial crises, the major latin american economies 
took a drastic turn towards unfettered capitalism. the us treasury’s partici-
pation in the process, as well as its powerful influence in multilateral organi-
zations such as the international monetary Fund (imF) and the World Bank, 
made the us government’s footprint on the economies of latin america so 
heavy that the policies adopted by most governments in the region were soon 
known worldwide as the policies of the “Washington consensus”2. However, 
while the hegemonic role played by the united states in latin america in the 
twilight and immediate aftermath of the cold War cannot be seriously ques-
1  On Cuba and the Cuban revolution: Richard Gott, Storia di Cuba (milano: mondadori, 2007 
[New Haven: 2005]). Among the many biographies of Castro, see: Volker Skierka, Fidel: A 
Biography (cambridge: polity, 2006). 
2  John Williamson, “What Washington means by policy reform”, in Latin American Adjust-
ment: How Much Has Happened, ed. John Williamson (Washington dc: institute for interna-
tional economics, 1990), 7-20. also: Jorge F. pérez-lópez, “the cuban economy in the age 
of Hemispheric integration”, Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 3 (1997), 3-47. 
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tioned, this essay argues that the cuban government did not merely struggle 
to survive in the changing international economic and political conditions, but 
undertook a set of skilled diplomatic moves during the latin american debt 
crisis and, somewhat surprisingly, managed to keep a certain degree of “soft 
power” for the island even during the hardships of the período especial.
1. In the Twilight of the Cold War
cuba entered the 1980s with a certain political and economic dynamism, 
but in virtual isolation from most of its close neighbors. politically, the cuban 
government was playing an international role by acting as chair of the non-
aligned movement and by maintaining its extensive military commitments 
to revolutionary movements in africa. as far as the Western Hemisphere was 
concerned, however, the continuing ban from the Organization of American 
States (OAS) symbolized the solidity of the cordon sanitaire built by the US 
around the island in the early 1960s. economically, the blockade established 
by the united states, and endorsed by most latin american countries, was 
still in place. With the virtually lone exception of mexico, no major latin 
american country had substantial trade relations with the socialist island.
nevertheless, cuba still capitalized on its own strategic relevance in the 
global context of the cold War, which had allowed it to gain from several 
favorable trade agreements with the soviet union, including, in particular, 
the exchanges of cuban sugar and soviet oil at subsidized prices. during 
the first half of the 1980s, cuba’s economic performance was a striking ex-
ception in the latin american landscape. integration into the cmea (the 
socialist camp’s council of mutual economic aid) had helped cuba reach 
an average annual Gdp growth rate of 6.7% from 1981 to 19853. in the rest 
of latin america, during those same years, the combination of large exter-
nal imbalances (often connected to the energy crisis of the early 1970s) and 
the high interest rates imposed by the us Federal reserve on international 
money markets had led instead to a virtual halt of economic growth4. latin 
america’s total external debt, calculated at $30 billion in 1970, reached $331 
billion in 1982 and grew to $410 billion by 1987 ($115 billion in Brazil, $105 
billion in Mexico, $50 billion in Argentina, $34 billion in Venezuela and $20 
billion in chile)5. With free-falling currencies, inflation sky-rocketed and 
3  c. tablada, “les nouveaux agents économiques dans une societé socialiste (cuba)”, in Cuba, 
quelle transition?, ed. aurelio alonso tejada (paris: l’Harmattan, 2001), 27-49: 32.
4  latin american Gdp had grown at an average of 5.7% from 1961 to 1970 and 6.0% from 1971 
to 1980: inter-american development Bank, Economic and Social Progress in Latin America: 1985 
Report (Washington dc: idB, 1985). more generally: John Ward, Latin America: Conflict and 
Development since 1945 (london: routledge, 1997), 13-20.
5  data reported in rudi dornbusch, “the latin american debt problem: anatomy and solu-
tions”, in Debt and Democracy, eds. Barbara stallings and robert Kaufman (Boulder: Westview, 
1989), 7-22: 12.
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production fell. By the beginning of 1987, overall latin american Gdp was 
6.5% below 1980 levels. in the same period, real consumption fell by 8% in 
Brazil and mexico, 14% in peru and 17% in argentina and chile6.
the phrase “Washington consensus” did not simply hint at the us in-
volvement in the debt crisis but also indicated a discernible set of privatiz-
ing and laissez faire-oriented measures that latin american governments 
had to undertake in order to enter new agreements for debt-financing and 
debt-rescheduling with private creditors, foreign governments and inter-
national institutions7. such policies were extremely harmful from a social 
standpoint. the costs of adjustment often weighed more on employed 
workers than on other social groups, while the concluding sales of pub-
lic industries often provided comfortable profit opportunities to part of 
the local elite and to foreign investors (at the same time, they guaranteed 
the flow of repayments to foreign commercial banks and other lending 
institutions)8. However, since it was consistent with classic liberal assump-
tions, it was officially assumed that, in the longer term, the “magic of the 
marketplace” would provide a more efficient allocation of resources with 
beneficial effects for the greater majority of the population9.
in most of the countries involved in the debt crisis, the early phase of 
structural adjustment was managed by authoritarian regimes, who often as-
sisted in keeping opposition down10. even as new parliamentary regimes en-
tered the scene by the mid-1980s, little changed in government approaches 
to debt negotiations. in countries where the transition towards parliamen-
tary democracy occurred under close military control (Brazil, argentina, 
uruguay and chile), the civilian leaders that guided the transitional govern-
ments were often carefully selected from conservative technicians that would 
not challenge the existing understandings between the outgoing military 
elite and international financial centers11. But even when the transition al-
lowed wider room for political maneuvering, new leaders often campaigned 
6  data reported in Howard Handelman and Werner Baer, “introduction: the economic and 
political costs of austerity”, in Paying the Costs of Austerity in Latin America, eds. Howard 
Handelman and Werner Baer (Boulder: Westview, 1989), 2-15. 
7  For a critical approach, see: david Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (New York: Oxford 
university press, 2005).
8  the debate over the outcomes of such policies is analyzed in donald Huddle, “post-1982 ef-
fects of Neoliberalism on Latin American Development and Poverty: Two Conflicting Views”, 
Economic Development and Cultural Change 4 (1997), 881-97.
9  see, for example, president reagan’s remarks: “responses to Questions submitted by latin 
american newspapers”, 30 november 1982, in university of california at santa Barbara, The 
American Presidency Project on-line (app), www.presidency.ucsb.edu (cited 25 march 2008).
10  this was acknowledged in cia, national intelligence estimate, “Brazil: prospects for the re-
gime”, 25 april 1984, secret; cia, national intelligence estimate, “chile: prospects for a demo-
cratic transition”, 1 december 1985, secret. Both documents are in central intelligence agency, 
Freedom of Information Act on-line (CIA-FOIA), www.cia.foia.gov (cited 25 March 2008).
11  For an in-depth appraisal of this point, see the contributions collected in: stallings and 
Kaufman, eds., Debt and Democracy. 
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against the harsh conditions attached to the financial packages, only to end 
up accepting them shortly after taking office. relative bargaining weakness, 
a seeming lack of alternatives and true admiration for what then seemed the 
miracle of “free market” policies in the us and some developing countries 
(namely south Korea), often combined with the lures of tangible personal 
advantages (which sometimes translated into sheer corruption) to determine 
the new leaders’ adherence to the Washington consensus. in a complete re-
versal of the development strategies followed in previous decades, privatiz-
ing state-owned companies, reducing tariffs, eliminating controls on flows 
of capital and limiting the bargaining power of unions all came to be seen as 
the primary tools to re-launch exports and repay debts.
protests and revolts against the deteriorating living conditions did take 
place in several countries. Vis-à-vis the creditors, the main Latin American 
debtors also threatened to enhance their bargaining position by joining in 
the “cartagena consensus” to denounce the political, and not simply eco-
nomic, nature of the debt problem12. the newly elected president of peru, 
alan García, unilaterally declared that his country would limit debt repay-
ment until after the domestic recession had been overcome13. the catholic 
church, an influential player on the latin american field, questioned the 
morality of the policies of the Washington consensus14. However, where-
as there were minor changes in the modalities in which the us-sponsored 
model of economic adjustment was promoted and applied, its basic phi-
losophy remained unchanged throughout the period15. Governments kept 
divesting public sectors and cutting social expenditures, even though this 
frequently meant selling off the most strategic industries (including the 
water supply in Bolivia’s case) to (often foreign) private companies and 
creating wide areas of poverty. according to World Bank data about the 
region, apart from variations, inequality peaked, malnutrition grew and by 
1996, a third of latin americans were living on less than two dollars a day 
(from a mere 11% in 1969)16.
12  Judith teichman, “the World Bank and policy reform in mexico and argentina”, Latin 
American Politics and Society 1 (2004), 39-74.
13  Eduardo Ferrero Costa, “Peruvian Foreign Policy: Current Trends, Constraints and Oppor-
tunities”, Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 2 (1987), 55-78.
14  pontifical Justice and peace commission, “an ethical approach to the international debt 
Question”, Origins 34 (1987), 601-611.
15  in the early 1980s, in particular, the us government refused to commit federal resources to 
debt-rescheduling plans, which not only forced latin american countries into faster adjust-
ment and a worse bargaining position but also made payments to creditor banks more dif-
ficult. eventually, with the so-called “Brady plan” of 1989 (from the name of then secretary of 
the treasury William Brady) the us agreed to guarantee private loans to indebted countries. 
What did not change throughout the years was the “tight conditionality” that was attached to 
the financial packages. On this, see: Secretary of the Treasury Regan to Reagan, “Results of the 
1983 WB/IMF Annual Meetings”, 6 October 1983, Confidential, Ronald Reagan Presidential 
Library, Simi Valley, USA (RRL), Executive, Secretariat NSC, Subject File, box 42, IMF.
16  Huddle, “post-1982”, 886-887. 
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2. The International Politics of the Debt Crisis: Cuba and Latin 
America
Beneath the surface of Washington’s growing economic and political in-
fluence in latin america, the latin american debt crisis offered Fidel castro 
the first serious opportunity in years to pull cuba out of regional isolation. 
in march 1985, in an interview with the mexican newspaper excelsior, the 
cuban leader began what would soon appear to be a relentless campaign 
against the political implications of “orthodox” foreign debt management17. 
castro invited latin america to unite and repeal the external debt. neither 
of the two objectives could be deemed alien to “socialist internationalism”, 
but both the regional focus and the arguments used seemed to mark a per-
ceivable shift in the form, if not the substance, of castro’s foreign policy. 
the march interview was not just a one-off: castro made latin american 
debt the main focus of his foreign policy speeches for months18. the cuban 
leader outlined three sorts of reasons why it was “impossible” to pay the 
debt. economically, the size of indebtedness was simply too large to be 
offset so that, by analogy with what is prescribed in most domestic legal 
codes, the burden of losses from bad investments should have been shared 
between debtor and creditor. politically, it would have been impossible for 
most governments to squeeze the living conditions of their citizens further 
without provoking rebellions and revolts, which castro did not appear to 
desire in that phase. morally, latin america had already paid enough to 
the wealthy north, first through colonial exploitation and more recently 
through “neo-colonialism”19. castro presented his solution in rather concil-
iatory terms, explaining that it would “not harm the international financial 
system”. in order to avoid global financial collapse from the sudden repeal 
of the debt, the líder máximo suggested that, rather than having the new 
latin american democracies pay for the debts incurred by their authoritar-
ian predecessors the federal us government should cut its defense budget 
and devote the amount saved to repay the creditor banks20.
castro’s reasoning was purposely provocative but far from improvised. 
the cuban government prepared the campaign carefully by arriving quickly 
at an agreement with its Western european creditors on its own outstanding 
$2.9 billion debt to show that it was not acting out of any immediate self-in-
17  castro’s speeches and thoughts on the debt crisis are collected in: Fidel castro, La deuda 
externa (La Habana: Editoria Politica, 1989). On the Cuban anti-debt campaign: Philip O’Brien, 
“‘The Debt cannot Be Paid’: Castro and the Latin American Debt”, Bulletin of Latin American 
Research 1 (1986), 41-63. more generally: Michael Kline, “Castro and ‘New Thinking’ in Latin 
america”, Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 1 (1990), 83-118.
18  Joseph treaster, “castro’s modest proposal”, New York Times, 25 august 1985. 
19  castro, La deuda externa, 46-58, 59-62 and 88-97. 
20  Jim Hoagland, “conversation with castro. marathon session: castro talks economics, not 
revolution”, The Washington Post, 3 February 1985.
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terest21. it also complemented the rhetoric offensive by hosting a large conti-
nental meeting “against the debt” in Havana in august 1985. although only 
a few governments sent official delegations, the success in terms of affecting 
public opinion was huge. More than one-thousand delegates from NGOs, 
workers unions, religious groups, political parties and even a few corpora-
tions arrived in the cuban capital from all over the continent at the expense 
of the cuban government22. debt relief made its way into the discussions of 
the latin american people, if not into those of their governments.
the lack of unity among latin american governments was abundantly 
displayed by the poor coordination of the cartagena group23. some latin 
american leaders even showed annoyance at castro’s campaign. Yet, diplo-
mats from the same countries that publicly criticized the cuban effort con-
fessed to reporters that most leaders were “privately delighted” by castro’s 
stance, which improved their bargaining position with creditors (although 
governments were interested in having better conditions for rescheduling, 
rather than repealing the debt altogether)24. in the words of one reporter: 
“emotionally they all agreed with castro”25.
as noted by the new York times columnist tad szulc in an article sig-
nificantly entitled “cuba’s emergence, america’s myopia”, the widespread 
perception in the latin american public opinion was that president reagan 
“did not care about their awesome economic crisis, [while] Fidel castro 
did”26. the cuban anti-debt campaign did not go completely unheard in 
Washington. indeed, some commentators have established a link between 
the cuban diplomatic offensive and the need for the us administration to 
present the so-called “Baker plan” in 1985, which recognized the global 
nature of the debt problem and committed substantial amounts of fresh 
money to the World Bank (an action the us government had previously re-
fused to take)27. From cuba’s standpoint, however, the only practical short-
term consequence of the campaign was the hardening of reagan’s resolve 
to crush the island economically28.
21  roger lowenstein, “cuba is in Good standing With Bankers despite castro’s talk of can-
celing debt”, The Wall Street Journal, 30 July 1985. 
22  Joseph treaster, “cuban meeting stokes emotions on latin debt”, New York Times, 1 august 
1985. 
23  us officials were well informed about the inner weakness and divergences in the cartagena 
consensus even before they emerged publicly: (nsc staffer) mulford to interagency Group 
on international debt, “a meeting of the iG”, 19 september 1984, confidential, rrl, executive 
secretariat nsc, subject File, box 42, imF. 
24  treaster, “cuban meeting”.
25  Joseph treaster, “castro Builds relations with south america”, New York Times, 19 may 1985.
26  tad szulc, “cuba’s emergence, america’s myopia”, New York Times, 5 may 1985. 
27  catherine Gwin, US Relations with the World Bank 1945-92 (Washington dc: Brookings, 
1994), 38-45. 
28  see: national security decision directive no. 235, “strengthening us policy toward cuba”, 
18 august 1986, secret, in Federation of america scientists, national security decision direc-
tives on-line, www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/index.html (cited 25 march 2008).
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it was in the longer run that the anti-debt offensive represented an 
unprecedented opportunity for cuba, allowing it to slowly find new in-
terlocutors–some of them, such as the catholic church, inconceivable in 
earlier times–and, most importantly, to regain a recognized position in 
the community of the latin american states. castro’s struggle for debt 
relief and regional cooperation coincided with the return to civilian rule 
in most of the continent. in that context, cuba gained diplomatic recogni-
tion and reopened trade contacts with most of its latin american neigh-
bors after more than two decades. throughout 1985, león Febres-cordero 
rivadeneira of ecuador was the first democratically elected president of 
a Latin American country to visit Cuba, while Raúl Alfonsin, the centrist 
president of argentina, and Julio maria sanguinetti, the conservative elect-
ed president of uruguay, reopened trade relations with cuba. Brazil fol-
lowed shortly thereafter in 198629. By 1989, all but three latin american 
countries (chile, paraguay and colombia) maintained regular diplomatic 
relations and incipient trade flows with cuba. it goes without saying that 
these mutual openings did not constitute a reversal of policies and alli-
ances in the southern half of the hemisphere. certainly most of the latin 
american leaders who reopened relations with cuba were staunch follow-
ers of the Washington consensus in their countries and could hardly be 
depicted as supporters of the cuban government. nevertheless, cuba’s of-
fensive on debt did capitalize on the need that most governments had, in a 
period of dramatic weakness, to show at least some independence from the 
united states. as instrumental as the rapprochement might have been, it 
was a major breakthrough for cuba’s diplomacy.
3. The International Politics of the Período Especial
although relatively immune to the economic turmoil of its neighbors, 
cuba was extremely vulnerable due to its dependency on the eastern 
Bloc. By 1986, trade with cmea countries had grown to cover an un-
precedented 85% of total cuban foreign trade: 98% of the fuel, 50% of 
the calories and 57% of the proteins consumed in the country came from 
cmea sources30. starting in 1985, however, the new general secretary of 
the soviet communist party, mikhail Gorbachev, accelerated moves to re-
duce the “imperial” commitments undertaken by his predecessors, partly 
in response to the challenging economic situation. more-realistic prices 
were to be set for sugar imports from and oil exports to cuba, in line with 
the tenets of perestroika. political considerations accompanied economic 
ones. From moscow’s “new thinking”, which stressed complementing 
29  Roger Lowenstein, “Cuba’s Castro Finds Friends in Region By Urging West to Pay Off Latin 
debts”, The Wall Street Journal, 23 may 1985.
30  tablada, “les nouveaux”, 39.
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rather than competing with the West, the caribbean island’s strategic 
significance diminished significantly for the soviets31. Bilateral contracts 
were renegotiated and eventually the flow of commodities came to a vir-
tual halt with the end of the soviet state. as Boris Yeltsin hauled the red 
flag down from the Kremlin in december 1991, the new russian lead-
ership ended all relevant economic and political relations with socialist 
cuba.
after his first meeting with Gorbachev in moscow in march 1986, Fidel 
castro had been extremely critical of perestroika and declared that he did 
not want to be involved in it32. However, given cuba’s dependency on 
the soviet union, non-involvement was hardly possible. cuba’s economy 
had to adjust. the first step was the “readdressing of mistakes” (politica 
de rectificación de errores), which diverted investments from inefficient 
sectors towards tourism, pharmaceutics and construction, while still aim-
ing to strengthen and rationalize the centrally-planned economy33. much 
more radical changes would occur after castro’s second meeting with 
Gorbachev, which took place in Havana in april 1989, only seven months 
before the fall of the Berlin Wall.
in January 1990, faced with the global retrenchment of the soviet 
union, Fidel castro spoke of the need for cuba to enter a “special pe-
riod in peacetime”34. the months that followed formed the most dramatic 
period for the cuban economy after the Revolución. Between 1990 and 
1993, cuban foreign trade plummeted by 70%. since most of the imports 
from cmea were in strategic raw materials and spare parts for indus-
trial plants, the resulting scarcity ignited a chain of economic shortages. 
annual sugar production was halved, while the end of soviet subsidies 
coincided with dropping prices in international markets. cuban Gdp 
dropped by nearly 30% in three years35, energy consumption was cut by 
half36 and by 1996 the cuban calorie intake had fallen 27% below the level 
in 199037.
31  On perestroika and “new thinking” in Gorbachev’s foreign policy: Vladislav Zubok, A Failed 
Empire. The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev (chapel Hill: university of 
north carolina press, 2007), 265-302; danuta paszyn, The Soviet Attitude To Political And Social 
Change in Central America, 1979–1990 (new York: st. martin’s , 2000).
32  Bill Keller, “Gorbachev-Castro Face-Off: A Clash of Style and Policies”, New York Times, 2 
april 1989.
33 tablada, “les nouveaux”, 36-38.
34 Gott, Storia, 335-349.
35 Jorge i. domínguez, “cuba’s economic transition: successes, deficiencies, and challeng-
es”, in The Cuban Economy at the Start of the Twenty-First Century, eds. Jorge i. domínguez, 
Omar E. Pérez Villanueva and Lorena Barberia (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2005), 17-48: 19 and 20.
36 Omar E. Pérez Villanueva, “The Cuban Economy Today and Its Future Challenges”, in The 
Cuban, eds. Domínguez, Pérez Villanueva and Barberia, 49-89: 65 and 76.
37  statistics of the Havana-based Centro de Investigaciones de la Economía Mundial, cited in 
domínguez, “cuba’s economic”, 43.
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commentators wrote daily about the imminent collapse of cuban 
socialism under the pressure of the dramatic economic crisis38. us intel-
ligence advanced their hypothesis that “the deterioration of the cuban 
economy [would have] further undermined castro’s legitimacy” and that 
there was “a better than even chance that Fidel castro’s government would 
fall within the next few years”39. certain episodes were seen as confirma-
tion of such forecasts (for example, in august 1994 when disputes erupted 
in Havana’s harbor, forcing castro himself to engage in lengthy talks with 
an angry crowd of youth who saw few opportunities on the island)40.
in this situation, the us government and congress actively sought to 
exploit the economic crisis in order to put an end to the cuban anomaly. 
under heavy lobbying from the cuban-american national Foundation, 
the congress passed the cuban democracy act of 1992, also known as 
the torricelli act, and the cuban liberty and democratic solidarity act of 
1996, also known as the Helms-Burton act, which limited family contacts, 
virtually terminated all trade between the two shores of the Florida strait 
and established before us courts the extra-territorial suitability of foreign 
companies doing business in cuba41. Furthermore, Washington-based in-
ternational financial institutions denied loans to cuba42.
Given these conditions, an economist of the Havana-based Centro de 
Investigaciones de la Economia Mundial observed some years later in a dis-
play of the cuban sense of humor that, with virtually no access to foreign 
credit, the socialist island had undergone, during the período especial, the 
only true “classical” economic adjustment. international prices had in-
creased, the external deficit had soared and domestic consumption had 
been curtailed to offset the loss in purchasing power43. However, the way 
in which this adjustment was carried out radically distinguished cuba 
from the rest of the continent.
38  the most-quoted incorrect prediction on the imminent collapse of cuban socialism is an-
drés Oppenheimer, Castro’s Final Hour (new York: touchstone, 1993).
39 respectively: national intelligence council, “soviet assistance to cuba: new estimates 
for 1986-90 and Outlook”, 9 September 1991, secret; and CIA, National Intelligence Estimate, 
“Cuba: The Outlook for Castro and Beyond”, 1 August 1993, secret. Both documents are in the 
CIA-FOIA database. The only CID/Gallup poll carried out in Cuba during the período especial 
found that, in 1994, roughly 69% of cubans considered themselves revolutionaries, socialists 
or communists and 58% thought that the revolution had comparatively more achievements 
than failures: peter roman, People’s Power: Cuba’s Experience with Representative Government 
(lanham: rowman & littlefield, 2003), 144. 
40  Geraldine lievesley, The Cuban Revolution: Past, Present and Future Perspectives (Gordons-
ville: palgrave, 2004), 161-6. 
41  see: stephen lisio, “Helms-Burton and the point of diminishing returns”, International Af-
fairs 4, The Americas: European Security (1996), 691-711; and Julia Sweig, “Fidel’s Final Victory”, 
Foreign Affairs 1 (2007), 5-13.
42  Jorge i. domínguez, “u.s.-cuban relations: From the cold War to the colder War”, Journal 
of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 3 (1997), 49-75. 
43 Osualdo Martínez Martinez, “Cuba dans le contexte de l’économie mondiale”, in Cuba, ed. 
alonso tejada, 167-179: 174.
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the cuban leadership sought to quickly work out a “socialist” way out 
of the deep economic crisis. although tourism was immediately identified 
as the most promising source of hard currency, the long-held suspicion 
towards external partners and the objective lack of consolidated relations 
with non-socialist countries initially led to an attempt to maintain the ex-
ternal balance by reducing consumption alone and concentrating the small 
amount of hard currency available on strategic imports44.
additional radical measures were undertaken after 1993. carlos lage, a 
former pediatrician who became cuba’s economic czar, legalized the own-
ership and use of the us dollar while seeking foreign investments in joint 
public-private ventures (in tourism and other selected industries) where 
the cuban state would hold at least 51% of the ownership. domestically, 
lage moved on to diversifying agriculture and partially deregulating self-
employment for small-scale economic activities while allowing rural coop-
eratives to sell their surplus products in town markets. He also introduced 
taxation, with a heavy emphasis on private activities45.
the development of these measures was a series of (sometimes con-
fusing) stops and gos that would last well into the first decade of the 21st 
century, when many cuban economists – not to mention their foreign 
counterparts – continued to debate the appropriate balance between pri-
vate, cooperative and public control over economic activity46. although it 
was not conceived as a first step towards capitalism, nor as a way to change 
the basic orientation of the cuban welfare-state system (even with all its 
economic “inefficiencies”), this second wave of adjustment policies did im-
ply a larger degree of opening up to the once-abhorred market tools and a 
greater shock to cuba’s social organization. though the economy did even-
tually rebound (Gdp growth averaged 3.6% between 1994 and 2001)47, the 
44 cuban economists reported a 31% fall in consumption from 1990 to 1993, with a 7% decline 
in social and government spending and a 39% drop in private spending. See: Viviana Togores 
and anicia García, “consumption, markets, and monetary duality in cuba”, in The Cuban, 
eds. Domínguez, Pérez Villanueva and Barberia, 245-295: 247.
45 domínguez, “cuba’s economic transition”, 25-30.
46 after the end of the cold War, debating the prospects of the cuban economy has been 
a widely practiced activity outside cuba. Forecasting and prescribing, however, has largely 
prevailed over analyzing and describing. a compendium of this type of work can be found 
in carlos mesa-lago and Jorge F. pérez-lópez, Cuba’s Aborted Reform: Socioeconomic Effects, 
International Comparisons and Transition Policies (Gainesville: university press of Florida, 2005). 
in contrast, while during the 1990s most cuban economists shifted away from the ideologi-
cal marxism and statism of previous decades, their work did not abandon a basic orientation 
towards an economic system based on social solidarity. see Fernando martínez Heredia, “iz-
quierda y marxismo en cuba”, Alternatives Sud, 3 (1996); and anthony maingot, “epistemic 
‘Organic Intellectuals’ and Cuba’s Battle of Ideas”, Florida International University, Cuban 
research institute report no. 4, 26 may 2007 (available on-line at http://cubainfo.fiu.edu/cu-
bacontext/reports/maingot4.swf).
47 A complete set of data on Cuba’s recent economic performance is in Omar E. Pérez Villan-
ueva, “Economía y Nivel de Vida en Cuba: Avances y Retos”, paper presented at the confer-
ence Governance and Social Justice in Cuba: Past, Present and Future, mexico city, 21-22 april, 
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firmly egalitarian society of the 1960s and 1970s was deeply shaken by the 
creation of tangible economic differences between those that could access 
foreign currencies (through tourism and foreign remittances) and those 
that could not48. at the same time, in a well-publicized report of the mid-
1990s, the un economic commission for latin america and the caribbean 
(cepal) emphasized that “given the size of the external shock, the policies 
of adjustment [in cuba] has been relatively low […] in comparison with 
other latin american economies”, attributing such an outcome to the “ori-
entation towards solidarity” of the cuban social context49.
4. Concluding Remarks
the rapprochement with the latin american countries did not end 
with the beginning of Cuba’s economic troubles. On the contrary, those 
years saw the consolidation of the cuban government’s institutional links 
with most latin american countries and ties with the progressive move-
ments of the continent. in 1987, eight latin american countries pushed 
for Cuba’s re-admission into the Organization of American States for 
the first time50. the attempt was unsuccessful, but in august 1989 the 
latin american countries contributed to the election of cuba as a non-
permanent member of the un security council51. in 1991, notwithstand-
ing us critiques made to the mexican organizers, Fidel castro was the 
uncontested star at the ibero-american summit, which brought together 
the heads of state and government of all latin american countries, plus 
spain and portugal52. precisely when us pressures for cuba’s domestic 
change were intensifying, the latin american governments turned their 
traditional abstentions into votes against the us blockade in the un 
General assembly, causing total votes against the blockade to jump from 
59 to 101 between 1992 and 1994. at the same time, the cuban way out of 
the crisis, with virtually no budgetary cuts to health care, education and 
social security, confirmed – or even increased – the country’s attractive-
2005 (available on-line at canadian Foundation for the americas, www.focal.ca/pdf/everleny.
pdf).
48 see, mayra e. prieto, “social effects of economic adjustment”, in The Cuban, eds. domín-
guez, Pérez Villanueva and Barberia, 209-43: 219 and 221. Nevertheless, in 2003, according to 
a World Bank study, cuba remained the least unequal country in latin america by far: World 
Bank, “inequality in latin america & caribbean: Breaking with History?”, 2003 (available on-
line at http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/lac/lac.nsf/ecadocByunid/4112F111).
49  cepal, La economia cubana. Reformas estructurales y desempeno en los noventa (santiago: ce-
pal, 1997), 15-6. cuba constantly ranked among the “high human development” countries 
in the yearly publications of the united nations development program (undp): undp, Lo 
sviluppo umano. Rapporto 2007-08 (torino: rosenberg & sellier, 2007), 287-95.
50  larry rohter, “8 latin chiefs urge cuba role in their region”, New York Times, 29 no-
vember 1987.
51  paul lewis, “cuba is elected to the un security council”, New York Times, 9 august 1989.
52  mark uhlig, “all eyes on cuba at ibero-american summit”, New York Times, 18 July 1991. 
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ness, especially in the latin american context, as a socio-economic model 
different than the prevailing one. latin american leftist leaders renewed 
their interest for the revolutionary island and often paid official visits to 
Havana53. all of this was not enough for cuba to avoid the hardships of 
the período especial. Yet, the record of the period stretching from the half 
of the 1980s to the half of the 1990s indicates that the cuban government 
was able, for the first time since the Revolución, to enter a significant net-
work of regional relations right at the height of the policies and ideology 
of the Washington consensus.
53  luiz ignacio “lula” da silva (elected Brazil’s president in 2002 and confirmed for a second 
term in office in 2006) visited Havana in 1989 as a union organizer and presidential candidate. 
Hugo Chávez Frias (elected Venezuela’s President in 1998 and confirmed for new terms in of-
fice in 2000 and 2006) was welcomed in the cuban capital with military honors in 1994.
